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FORECAST MODEL BUILDING: THE PRACTICAL ISSUES
INTRODUCTION
hroughout the recent recession,  companies 
have watched sales and production shrink 
by unprecedented amounts. Month ater 
month, outturns have not merely fallen 
short of central forecasts but have crashed 
through the lower limits of prediction 
intervals churned out by statistical models. 
Conventional business-forecasting systems 
are just not set up to tell us about extreme 
events. 
Downside risk has long been a central 
concern of inancial forecasters. In the 
 inancial markets, high volatility in prices 
means large potential losses for investors, 
and risk-averse hedgers will pay more for 
insurance against adverse events. Option 
pricing theory ties the cost of insurance 
directly to the  forecast of volatility of future 
Worst-Case Scenarios in Forecasting: 
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price changes. A massive academic and 
 practitioner literature has sprung up, focused 
on getting good predictions of whether 
share prices,  currencies, and commodities 
are likely to become more or less volatile in 
the future. 
Volatility changes can be forecast. Day-to-
day price changes are close to random, but 
the volatility of these price changes is serially 
correlated:  If there is a big price change (up 
or down) on one day, it is more likely than 
not that there will be a big price change the 
following day (down or up, we don’t know 
which).  
More recently, downside risk has become 
an important issue for business forecasters 
who are concerned with future sales, rather 
than prices on the inancial markets. Most 
preVIeW.  Roy Batchelor, Foresight’s Financial Forecasting  Editor, explains that conventional busi-
ness-forecasting models are not set up to tell us about the impacts of extreme events—hence, their 
worst-case forecasts are liable to be less severe than the worst that plays out in the future. While rec-
ognition of this caveat is  important in itself, there are ways to model the impacts of extreme events 
and thus derive a realistic indication of  downside risk.
Worst-Case Damage from a Blowout in the Gulf of Mexico
According to news reports, the main contingency plan foresaw 
a blowout with a worst-case spill of 40 million gallons in total. 
During the irst three months, millions of gallons have been gush-
ing per day. Regulatory agencies based their eforts on worst-case 
scenarios that weren’t nearly worst case.
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Key Points
companies try to deine “worst-
case scenarios” for sales. Models 
of inventory control rely heavily 
on estimates of the future volatil-
ity of demand. Yet somehow, the 
well-developed technology of 
volatility forecasting has not been 
transferred into the business 
domain. To see what that would 
involve, I have set out below the 
procedure for deining a worst-
case scenario that would follow 
from reading a basic business 
forecasting text. hen I illustrate 
how the transfer of a small piece 
of volatility forecasting technol-
ogy – the GARCH variance model – from a 
inancial to a business-forecasting environ-
ment can help quantify downside risk. 
A STANDARD VIEW OF 
NEW CAR SALES
Consider the point of view of a forecaster 
trying to predict new-car sales in the U.S. 
through the 2008-9 recession. Imagine we are 
in early September 2008. We have a prelimi-
nary estimate of August sales of around 
630 thousand vehicles. his was about 10% 
lower than August of a year earlier, but still 
well within the range of 500-800 thousand 
that had been the norm since 2000. Visual 
inspection of the monthly data on Figure 1 
suggests that a worst-case scenario would be 
monthly sales below 500 thousand, an event 
that happened in only three of the previous 
103 months. 
To generate a forecast for September 2008 
onwards, we need a model for car sales. I 
have used a conventional time-series repre-
sentation using data back to 1980, a seasonal 
ARIMA model. he forecasts from this 
model are shown on Figure 2, in the form 
that is generated by most standard business-
sotware packages. his shows expected sales 
(red line) and upper and lower bounds to 
the 95% prediction interval. he idea is that, 
in 95% of forecast months, sales should lie 
within these limits. Sales are forecast to be 
around 600 thousand cars per month, with 
some seasonal luctuations. he bad case 
is for sales to fall below 494 thousand in 
September. he estimated reliability of the 
central forecast is relected in its  standard 
•  Standard statistical models provide mislead-
ing evidence for deining the “worst-case” 
possibilities when there is a serious shock to 
the business, as happened to the world’s Wall 
and Main streets during this past recession.  
•  Serious shocks normally increase the 
 volatility of sales; this extra volatility has 
to be modeled appropriately. When we are 
 looking at  extreme events, it is important 
to  understand that the worst event that 
has already happened in the sample is not 
as bad as the worst event that can possibly 
happen.
•  One modeling approach used in inance is 
called garch, a method that  assumes that 
volatility and hence expected forecast errors 
increase after a large external shock.  
•  Through a case study of automobile sales, 
I illustrate how a garch model provides a 
more realistic forecast of the downside risk 
facing this industry.
Figure 1. New Car Sales, January 2000- August 2008 
( thousands)
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part is treated as a signal that the underlying 
level of the series has permanently fallen. 
Less sensible is what happens to the predic-
tion interval. he bad case is now for sales to 
be 413 thousand. his is 92 thousand below 
the mean forecast, suggesting a standard 
error of 92/2 = 46 thousand. his is actually 
lower than a month earlier, and still only 9% 
of the new mean forecast. So, 
ater the worst shock to car 
sales in living memory, the 
standard business-forecasting 
model suggests that our fore-
casts will be just as reliable as 
they were before the shock 
happened! 
To underline how unrealistic 
this is, Figure 3 also shows 
that sales in October again fell 
below the model-generated 
lower prediction bound. Two 
successive outcomes below the 
lower bound is a very unusual 
occurrence and should make 
us reconsider how our bad-case forecast has 
been constructed. We could keep going – but, 
month ater month, the standard error of the 
one-month-ahead forecast would stay stuck 
at about 9% of the forecast level, regardless 
of whether the economic conditions were 
calm or stormy. 
error, which we could loosely deine as the 
size of a typical monthly error. Larger values 
of the standard deviation imply less  reliability. 
his lower bound is around two standard 
errors below the expected level of sales, so the 
standard error of our one-month-ahead fore-
cast is about 1/2 x (600-494) = 53 thousand 
cars, or about 9% of the central forecast. 
What actually happened in September 2008, 
the month of the Lehman bankruptcy, was 
that consumer conidence plummeted, 
spending contracted across the economy, and 
car sales fell to an all-time low of 481 thou-
sand, below the model’s bad-case  estimate. 
Of course, we expect there to be two to 
three months in every decade when sales fall 
below the lower prediction bound. his was 
an extreme adverse event, and leads to our 
key question: Given such a shock, how much 
worse can things get?
Let’s stick with our conventional model and 
make a new set of forecasts for October 2008 
and beyond, in light of information about the 
collapse in sales in September. he new path 
of expected sales and lower bound to the 95% 
prediction interval are shown in Figure 3. 
Sales are predicted to rebound to 505 thou-
sand and then continue along a path some-
what lower than had been forecast a month 
earlier. Very sensibly, part of the fall in sales 
in September is treated as a temporary efect 
that will be ofset in the following month, and 
Figure 2. Forecasts and Outturn for September 2008
Figure 3. Forecasts and Outturn for October 2008
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TIME-VARYING 
VOLATILITY IN CAR SALES
he problem is that conventional time-series 
and regression models assume that the distri-
bution of shocks to the system stays unchanged 
over time. Sometimes shocks are large and 
sometimes small, but these are treated as 
random draws from an underlying probabil-
ity  distribution that has a constant volatility. 
Prediction intervals from these models are 
based on an estimate of the  average volatility 
of residuals over the whole sample used in 
model estimation. When a new observation 
appears, no matter how extreme it is, it has 
only a marginal efect on the estimated vari-
ance of residuals, and hence scarcely afects 
prediction intervals. 
his assumption of constant volatility of 
shocks – called homoscedasticity – is not 
one that would be entertained in any model 
of inancial markets, where it is plain that 
 periods of steady growth in markets are 
punctuated by booms and crashes, during 
which volatility rises sharply. Since the Nobel 
Prize-winning economist Rob Engle devel-
oped the so-called ARCH ( autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity) model in the 
1980s, it has become standard to  characterize 
inancial time series by some variant of 
this model. Financial economists are also 
 reluctant to assume that shocks are normally 
distributed, preferring “fat-tailed” distribu-
tions such as the t-distribution, which allow 
extreme events to occur more frequently 
than suggested by the normal curve. 
In the most popular “generalized ARCH” 
or GARCH model, there is some long-term 
underlying average variance, but in the short 
term the variance of potential shocks can 
rise above this underlying level if there is an 
unexpectedly large shock (=  large forecast 
error) to the series being modeled. I describe 
the GARCH model in Box 1.  
Regression packages churn out tests for 
normality in residuals (Jarque Bera test) 
and for ARCH errors (Engle’s Lagrange 
 multiplier test). hese are oten ignored 
Box 1. The GARCH Model
Suppose we are using time-series data to forecast a target 






 where b is a vector of coef-
icients, and the u
t
 are regression residuals (“shocks” that 
cannot be explained by the predictors x). The standard 
assumption is that the u
t
 are normally distributed and have 
a standard deviation σ that is constant over time. 
The GARCH model allows σ to vary over time. Speciically, 
if at time t-1 there was a big shock (so the squared residual 
ut-12 is large), then volatility σ will rise. Conversely, if the last residual was small, then σ will fall. The exact formula used is 
σ
t
2 = a0 + a1ut-12  + a2σt-12.  The larger the size of a1 relative to a
2
 , then the greater the inluence will be of the latest 
shock on our new estimate of volatility. The closer a
2
 is to 
1, the more long-lived will be the efect of a large shock on 
the volatility of y in subsequent time periods. 
The distribution of the shocks ut need not be normal, and in the case of car sales follows a t-distribution with 8 degrees 
of freedom, showing that there are many more extreme 
events. In this case, the 95% prediction interval is not ±2σ, 
but ±2.3σ, making the margin of uncertainty wider and the 
worst-case scenario even worse.
For the U.S. car market, a
1
 is 0.20 and highly signiicant, 
meaning that an unexpected 10% fall in sales leads to a rise 
of √(0.2*.102) = 4.5% in the standard deviation of car sales 
in the following month. Therefore, if volatility had been 
around 8% of sales, an unexpected 10% fall in sales would 
cause volatility to rise to 12.5% of car sales – exactly what 
happened between September and October 2008. 
The coeicient a
2
 is 0.6, so the shock has a half-life of 1/
(1-.6) = 2.5 months. That is, after the initial large impact of 
the shock, in the absence of further shocks volatility will 
die away towards a baseline level quite quickly over the 
following months. 
There are many variants of the GARCH model. With car sales, 
reactions to good news and bad news are the same. This is 
why volatility rose after the unexpected surge in sales in 
August 2009. However, with stock prices, a large fall in the 
market increases volatility much more than a large rise, so 
when modeling the stock market the coeicient a1 would 
be higher for negative shocks than for positive shocks.  
A relatively nontechnical review of GARCH is given in Robert 
Engle (2001), GARCH 101: The Use of ARCH/GARCH Models 
in Applied Econometrics, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
15, 4, 157-168, downloadable at http://pages.stern.nyu.
edu/~rengle/Garch101.doc
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because they do not bias central forecasts. 
hey are critical, however, for construct-
ing prediction  intervals. herefore, we can 
easily test  whether shocks to car sales can be 
described by a GARCH model and whether 
their distribution contains more extreme 
events than normal. he answer is yes, and 
yes. Volatility in car sales does rise ater 
unusually large and unexpected increases 
and decreases in sales. When shocks occur, 
there are more large changes than the normal 
curve would lead us to expect. 
Let’s revisit the forecasts for September and 
October 2008, using the same ARIMA model 
for car sales but allowing the distribu-
tion of shocks to be fat-tailed and have 
time- varying volatility. Figure 4 shows 
the efect of the GARCH assumption 
on the mean forecast and the lower 
prediction interval bound. he mean 
forecast is unchanged. However, the 
large shock that occurred in September 
2008 has caused the model to revise 
sharply upwards its estimate of the like-
ly volatility of future shocks. he lower 
prediction bound for October is now 
386 thousand, much lower than the 413 
thousand estimated by the conventional 
model. 
he outturn of 400 thousand is now 
inside rather than outside the  prediction 
interval, and in that sense is less  surprising. 
he fact that the October outturn is well 
below its expected 
value also means that, 
when we make our 
 forecast for November, 
the GARCH model 
will again predict 
that volatility will be 
high, the prediction 
interval large, and the 
bad case will again be 
pretty bad. 
Figure 5 shows the 
GARCH model 
 estimates of how the 
standard deviation of 
shocks in the car market has changed from 
month to month since 2000. Although the 
average  volatility is indeed around 9%, it 
can change drastically from year to year, and 
the very steep rise to over 15% in the recent 
recession shows that models of car sales 
that neglect changes in volatility provide us 
with a very poor guide to the risks faced by 
producers and dealers. 
Note, by the way, that the most recent peak 
in volatility was due not to a collapse in 
sales, but to the splurge of buying in August 
2009 in response to the “cash for clunkers” 
Figure 4. Lower 95% Prediction Bounds: 
Conventional v. GARCH
Figure 5. GARCH estimates of time-varying volatility (standard deviation) of 
new-car sales
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scheme that subsidized the replacement of 
old cars by new, more fuel-eicient vehicles. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I have looked here at just one way of  reining 
estimates of prediction intervals, using a 
simple model of time-varying volatility. here 
are many other ingenious devices for looking 
at downside risk in the inancial-risk manag-
er’s toolkit. For example, some analysts 
ignore all but the most extreme events and 
use special extreme value  distributions to 
approximate the shape of the let tail of 
probability distributions. hese methods are 
viable only if we have many observations on 
extreme events, and this in turn depends 
on the availability of high frequency, daily, 
or intraday data over a long time period – 
conditions that rule out most mainstream 
business-forecasting applications. 
Business forecasters don’t oten take predic-
tion intervals seriously and have some 
incentives to keep quiet about them. Most of 
the time, the intervals look very scary. With 
moderate sample sizes, the conventional 
95% prediction interval for three to four 
steps ahead typically encompasses the whole 
range of historic data, and colleagues and 
clients might be tempted to conclude that 
you are saying, “Anything can happen.” 
Unfortunately, this is true. Indeed, results 
from forecasting competitions consistently 
tell us that, if anything, statistical prediction 
intervals are too narrow, since we can rarely 
identify the true model driving our data, and 
all series are subject to unforecastable struc-
tural change. 
Frank Sinatra had the lyric “he best is yet 
to come” inscribed on his tombstone. When 
forecasting extreme events, it is important 
to understand, as well, that the worst is yet 
to come. he worst thing that has already 
happened in the sample is an upper estimate 
of the worst thing that can possibly happen. 
he honest answer to the question “How bad 
can things get?” is that they can always be 
worse than they have ever been before. 
he value of models with time-varying vola-
tility is that they help us quantify exactly 
how much worse things can get: whether 
right now we are confronted with a low or 
a normal degree of risk, or whether – as in 
September 2008 – volatility is unusually 
high, and one of these unprecedentedly bad 
outcomes is most likely to occur.
When forecasting extreme events, it is important to un-
derstand, as well, that the worst is yet to come. The worst 
thing that has already happened in the sample is an up-
per estimate of the worst thing that can possibly happen. 
The honest answer to the question “how bad can things 
get?” is that they can always be worse than they have ever 
been before. 
Roy Batchelor is Fore-
sight’s Financial Forecast-
ing Editor.  His day job 
is  professor of banking 
at Cass Business School, 
City  University of London.  
Roy consults  extensively 
for public and private 
 organizations and has 
spent considerable time 
recently helping  Dubai overcome its inancial 
 di culties.
r.a.batchelor@city.ac.uk
Copyright of Foresight: The International Journal of Applied Forecasting is the property of International
Institute of Forecasters and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv
without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email
articles for individual use.
